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HORTON THE ELEPHANT INTERPRETS THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: HOW 
THE FEDERAL COURTS SOMETIMES DO AND 
ALWAYS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THEM 
Donald L. Doernberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.
1
 
made it worse, and that was after Dr. Seuss had pointed the way.
2
 The 
Rules Enabling Act (“REA”),3 authorizing the Supreme Court to 
promulgate rules of civil procedure for the federal courts, limited the 
Court’s power: “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”4 The Court has always struggled with that language, 
from its first encounter in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.
5
 to the present. The 
Sibbach test was whether “a rule really regulates procedure”6—hardly a 
test of great precision. However, as the Court struggled to elaborate on  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 * Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A. Yale University 1966; J.D. 
Columbia University 1969. I thank my faculty colleagues for their helpful questions and insights 
during one of our faculty colloquia in the summer of 2012. I am also especially grateful to the three 
research assistants with whom I have been fortunate to work on this Article: Lauren A. Bachtel, 
Class of 2013, Gillian Kirsch and Ann Marie Bermont, both Class of 2014. They have been of 
enormous assistance doing research and helping me to think through the thesis, and have been 
exceptionally demanding editors. Such folks are treasures. 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 2. See DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG 16, 21, 26, 34, 38 (Random House 1990) (“I 
meant what I said, and I said what I meant.”). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 4. Id. § 2072(b). 
 5. 312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
 6. Id. at 14. 
800 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:799 
the vertical choice-of-law doctrine
7
 stemming from Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,
8
 the REA was eclipsed for some years. 
Questions involving the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal 
Rules” or “Rules”) and the REA are simply a subset of that larger 
problem—the choice between having state law or federal law apply to an 
issue. The Judiciary Act of 1789
9
 addressed that problem in two 
provisions that have come to be known as the Rules of Decision Act 
(“RDA”)10 and the Process Act of 1789.11 Since Erie—which is now 
over the three quarters of a century old—the Court has spent 
considerable energy addressing the vertical choice-of-law problem, but 
with only mixed success. 
In Shady Grove, the Court considered whether a federal class action 
was maintainable in a diversity case where state law forbade class 
actions.
12
 The justices were sharply split into shifting majorities. One 
majority concluded that Rule 23 was not substantive for REA purposes 
and that it applied, but its members could not agree on why.
13
 Four 
justices thought it was proper to look only at the Federal Rule in 
question to see whether it addressed substance or procedure on its face.
14
 
A different majority supported an approach to REA questions that 
                                                          
 7. Vertical choice of law refers to a choice between federal and state law governing a 
particular issue. See Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and 
Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 612 n.2 
(2007) [hereinafter Doernberg, The Unseen Track]. 
 8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 9. ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). The RDA states: 
And be it further enacted, That the laws of the several states, except where the 
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, 
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United 
States in cases where they apply.  
Id. 
 11. ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (repealed 1948). The Process Act of 1789 states: 
And be it further enacted, That until further provision shall be made, and except where 
by this act or other statutes of the United States is otherwise provided, the forms of writs 
and executions, except their style, and modes of process and rates of fees, except fees to 
judges, in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in 
each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same.  
Id. 
 12. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010). There 
is precedent for federal procedure permitting joinder in circumstances where state law would not. 
See, e.g., Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc., 2 F.R.D. 238, 240-41 (D. Minn. 1942). In Jeub v. B/G Foods, 
Inc., the defendant was allowed to implead a third-party defendant under Rule 14 even though state 
law provided no impleader, but it did allow indemnity actions. Id. The court determined that 
Rule 14 merely accelerated the timing of the state-recognized indemnity action, and therefore 
Rule 14 had no forbidden substantive effect. Id.; see infra note 201. 
 13. See infra notes 173-98 and accompanying text. 
 14. Shady Grove, 132 S. Ct. at 1442-44. 
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required evaluating state law to determine whether the Federal Rule was 
substantive.
15
 Because those justices forgot the lesson of Hanna v. 
Plumer,
16
 the seminal 1965 REA case, their approach introduced new 
uncertainties to an area that had been clearer
17—which was a mistake. 
The Court’s approach to Federal Rules problems from Hanna, in 1965, 
until Shady Grove, in 2010, is preferable. It provides a historically 
justifiable bright-line test for how to read a Federal Rule—as concerning 
only matters to which the Rule directly speaks. 
This Article proceeds in four further Parts. Part II briefly 
summarizes the Erie doctrine and canvasses the Court’s approach to the 
Federal Rules from 1938, when they took effect, to 1965, when the 
Court decided Hanna.
18
 Part III takes a close look at Hanna, which 
declared that a Federal Rule must speak with read-my-lips clarity to 
apply to an issue.
19
 Hanna did not say that federal courts may read a 
Rule for more than appears on its face, and Walker v. Armco Steel Co.
20
 
continued that approach.
21
 Part III also discusses the implications of the 
Hanna analysis and subsequent cases that have applied Hanna’s 
approach.
22
 Part IV briefly canvasses the opinions in Shady Grove with 
respect to the two approaches to REA questions.
23
 Part V argues that the 
Hanna-Walker line of cases exemplifies the proper method of inquiry 
under the REA and that REA questions need not be as hard as the Court, 
particularly in Shady Grove, has made them look.
24
 
II. VERTICAL CHOICE OF LAW FROM ERIE TO SHADY GROVE 
From 1938 (Erie) to 1965 (Hanna), the Court used a single 
analytical technique to decide: (1) whether federal common law could 
exist, and (2) the scope of a Federal Rule. Hanna forever changed that, 
holding that the REA calls for an analytical technique distinct from that 
of the RDA, which governs whether federal common law can exist.
25
 
Accordingly, it is a bit artificial to separate the Erie cases—regarding  
 
 
                                                          
 15. See infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 16. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 17. See discussion infra Part V. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 29-82. 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 83-111. 
 20. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
 21. See id. at 750. 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 112-58. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 172-209. 
 24. See infra text accompanying notes 212-42. 
 25. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 473 (1965). 
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federal common law—from the Federal Rules cases in the pre-Hanna 
era. Nonetheless, looking backward from the post-Hanna era, the 
importance of doing so is clear. 
A. An Erie Précis 
In 1842, Swift v. Tyson
26
 interpreted the RDA to permit federal 
courts to determine common law rules independently of the states’ 
views, limiting the RDA’s command to state constitutions, statutes, and 
“local” common law principles applying to immovables, chiefly real 
property.
27
 Swift seems to have intended to foster development of 
nationally recognized principles of general common law, leading to 
greater uniformity in decisions among the states and in the federal 
courts.
28
 That hope died when the states did not adopt those principles, 
which ironically meant that Swift practically guaranteed disuniformity by 
interpreting the RDA not to require application of states’ common law 
rules. Not until 1938 did Erie overrule Swift.
29
 Justice Louis Brandeis’s 
majority opinion sounded almost plaintive about Swift’s ineffectiveness: 
“Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of 
common law prevented uniformity, and the impossibility of discovering 
a satisfactory line of demarcation between the province of general law 
and that of local law developed a new well of uncertainties.”30 But Erie 
created problems because it did not clearly set out what areas were 
appropriate for federal common law. Thus, it bequeathed to future courts 
the set of issues subsumed under vertical choice of law. 
Make no mistake; Erie did not contemplate the demise of  
federal common law, which explains why Justice Brandeis, quoting 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, was careful to specify the defect in 
Swift’s doctrine: 
[It] rests upon the assumption that there is ‘a transcendental body of 
law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and 
until changed by statute,’ that federal courts have the power to use 
                                                          
 26. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 27. Id. at 18-19. 
 28. A word of explanation about “general law” is in order. Before Erie, there were three kinds 
of law in the United States: federal law, state law, and general law. Doernberg, The Unseen Track, 
supra note 7, at 617. The general law arose from a natural law conception, and it existed apart from 
any sovereignty. Id. It was not federal law created under the Constitution. See id. For that reason, 
the Supremacy Clause did not compel the states to fall into line. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
Erie represents, among other things, the rejection of natural law theory in the United States in favor 
of a positivist conception, long championed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. See Doernberg, The 
Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 617, 621, 623-25. 
 29. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69, 79-80 (1938). 
 30. Id. at 74. 
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their judgment as to what the rules of [general] common law are; and 
that in the federal courts ‘the parties are entitled to an independent 
judgment on matters of general law’: 
  ‘But law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not 
exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far 
as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not 
the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the 
authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in 
England or anywhere else.’
31
  
Thus, Justice Holmes had articulated the positivist thesis, which Erie 
adopted.
32
 That clearly did not eliminate the category of federal common 
law because, in the very next case after Erie in the U.S. Reports, Justice 
Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court, applied a federal common 
law rule.
33
 
Erie left questions in its wake. When can federal common law exist 
and when must the federal courts use state law? Erie was cryptic: 
“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law 
applicable in a State, whether they be local in their nature or 
‘general,’ . . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such 
a power upon the federal courts.”34 The second sentence suggests that 
the federal courts’ common law powers are at least no broader than 
Congress’s legislative powers. The first sentence may be even more 
important because it connotes that Congress and the federal courts might 
have the power to declare rules of procedure—a good thing, since 
Congress had passed the REA in 1934, and the Court thereafter 
promulgated the Federal Rules.
35
 Erie also bequeathed the question of 
how to distinguish substantive from procedural law. Erie itself gave no 
further clue; the word “substantive” appears nowhere else in the opinion, 
and “procedural” does not appear at all. 
The next attempt to distinguish substantive from procedural rules 
for Erie purposes came in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
36
 but it did not 
involve the Federal Rules. The Court declared that, if applying a federal 
law to a particular issue would change the outcome of the case, then the 
matter was substantive for Erie purposes, meaning that the federal courts 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & 
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
 32. See Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. at 533-34; see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 
79; Doernberg, The Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 617. 
 33. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). 
 34. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
 35. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). The Federal Rules first became effective in 1938. 
See McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 65 (1939). 
 36. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
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had to use the state law.
37
 In diversity cases, the Court said that a federal 
court is, “in effect, only another court of the state.”38 But it is easy to 
over-read that statement to connote either that all conflicts between 
federal and state law result in the application of state law, or that Erie 
commands so narrow a reading of federal law that it cannot conflict  
with state law. The Court’s blanket assertion elides the Supremacy 
Clause consideration. 
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.
39
 introduced a 
balancing approach. The substantive issue was whether the plaintiff’s 
decedent was a statutory employee.
40
 If so, only workers’ compensation 
remedies were available.
41
 The procedural issue on which the Court 
focused was whether the judge or the jury should resolve that 
substantive issue. Under state law, that was an issue for the court; federal 
law made it a jury question.
42
 The Supreme Court weighed the state 
interests in application of the state rule against the federal interests in 
application of the federal rule, and applied the federal practice because it 
found the federal interest in controlling the internal working procedures 
                                                          
 37. Id. at 109-10. Changing the outcome does not necessarily mean that one party or the other 
achieves final victory. See id. More often, the choice between state and federal law either ends the 
case or permits it to continue. See id. In Guaranty Trust, the choice of the state limitations period 
ended the case with a dismissal. Id. at 100-01. Choosing federal law would not have given Grace 
York a judgment for damages; it simply would have permitted the case to go forward for a decision 
on the merits. See id. The limitation of Erie’s purposes is important. Laws may be substantive for 
some purposes and procedural for others, as the law surrounding statutes of limitations illustrates. 
See id. Guaranty Trust involved the question of whether York’s action was timely. Id. at 107. Under 
state law, it was not. Id. York urged application of the federal rule of laches. See id. at 101. 
Choosing the Federal Rule would have allowed the action to proceed; applying the state law 
obviously would end it. Id. at 109-10. The Court applied the state law because it was outcome 
determinative; that was the vertical choice-of-law rule. See id. at 110-12. On the other hand, in most 
circumstances, for horizontal choice-of-law purposes, statutes of limitations are procedural. See, 
e.g., PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.10 (5th ed. 2010) (noting “the traditional American 
(procedural) characterization of the Statute of Limitations”). Suppose a second accident on the Erie 
footpath occurred after Guaranty Trust and that the victim, as in Erie, sued in the Southern District 
of New York. Assume that the relevant New York limitation was three years and that the relevant 
Pennsylvania limitation was only two. The federal court, following Guaranty Trust, would apply the 
limitations period that the New York courts would use because statutes of limitations are 
substantive for vertical choice-of-law purposes. That requires the federal court to determine whether 
the New York courts would use the New York or Pennsylvania statute of limitations. The New York 
state courts would apply the New York limitations period rather than Pennsylvania’s because 
statutes of limitation are almost always procedural for horizontal choice-of-law purposes. Thus, the 
federal court would use the three-year period because it is substantive for Erie purposes, and New 
York state court would have chosen the three-year period because it is procedural. 
 38. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108-09. 
 39. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). 
 40. Id. at 527. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 533-35. 
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of federal courts to be dominant.
43
 Outcome determinativeness was still 
a factor, weighing in favor of state law, but it was no longer the entire 
test.
44
 Important federal interests could outweigh outcome 
determinativeness, as Byrd demonstrated. 
Throughout those years, the Court did not distinguish the Erie 
choice-of-law problem from issues involving the Federal Rules. Eight 
years after Byrd, Hanna recognized that the inquiries were radically 
different.
45
 After Hanna, with respect to choice-of-law matters not 
involving the Federal Rules, the Court continued the analysis that 
animated Erie and Byrd. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.
46
 
considered a New York statute dealing with both substance and 
procedure.
47
 On the substantive side, in cases where New York law 
requires an itemized damages verdict, the statute makes the verdict 
unlawful “if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable 
compensation.”48 On the procedural side, the statute directs New York’s 
intermediate appellate court to make that evaluation.
49
 
In an opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court divided 
how it approached the New York law.
50
 The deviates-materially standard 
was substantive for Erie purposes and, hence, had to govern in the 
diversity action.
51 
The Court, however, balked at assigning the job of 
determining whether an award violated the substantive standard to the 
federal circuit court because of the conflict that would arise with the 
Seventh Amendment.
52
 So, the Court played Solomon: while 
recognizing that the damage cap applied, it assigned applying it to the 
federal trial judge under Federal Rule 59, which, reflecting the common 
law, had always allowed that court to order a new trial if the verdict was  
 
 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 538-39. 
 44. Id. at 539-40. 
 45. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); discussion infra Part III. 
 46. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 47. See id. at 426. 
 48. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2013). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 428-31. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury[] shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”); 
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438. Before Gasperini, several circuits had reviewed a trial judge’s denials 
of motions for new trials based on the excessiveness of the verdict, using an abuse-of-discretion 
standard. Id. at 434-35. Gasperini explicitly approved such review. Id. at 434-36. Note, however, 
that the suggested standard falls far short of the more searching appellate review that New York had 
prescribed in section 5501(c). See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c); Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 438. 
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“against the weight of the evidence.”53 That avoided the Seventh 
Amendment problem. 
Note, however, that Gasperini was not a Federal Rules case. There 
was no Federal Rule addressing damage caps. The Court called Rule 59 
into service to accommodate New York’s substantive interest, using a 
substitute federal procedural device rather than allowing the Second 
Circuit to emulate New York’s Appellate Division.54 Above all, 
Gasperini was a case in the Erie line, not in the Hanna line. 
Accordingly, the Byrd analytical technique—balancing the state and 
federal interests—led the Court to apply the state damages limit, but to 
supplant the state’s procedural mechanism for enforcing the limit, 
replacing it with a procedure consonant with the internal workings of the 
federal judiciary.
55
 That is precisely what the Court had done in Byrd. 
B. The Jurisprudence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 1965 
Sibbach was a diversity action sounding in tort—automobile 
negligence—presenting both horizontal and vertical choice-of-law 
issues.
56
 The state in which the accident occurred and Federal Rule 35 
permitted physical examinations of injured plaintiffs; however, the 
forum state did not.
57
 The district court ordered the petitioner to submit 
to a physical examination and, upon her refusal, held her in contempt.
58
 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding Rule 35 valid under the REA.
59
 
The Supreme Court affirmed that conclusion.
60
 
The petitioner in Sibbach conceded that Rule 35 was procedural, 
but argued that the forum state’s law conferred on her a substantive 
right—a privilege to avoid physical examination—that Rule 35 
abridged.
61
 The Court noted that, “[i]n order to reach this result [the 
petitioner] translate[d] substantive into important or substantial rights. 
And she urge[d] that if a [merely procedural] rule affect[ed] such a 
right, . . . its prescription [was] not within the statutory grant of power 
embodied in the [REA].”62 The Court clarified that “[t]he test must be 
                                                          
 53. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-33 (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc., 356 
U.S. 525, 540 (1958)). 
 54. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-33. 
 55. See id. at 436-38. 
 56. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1941). 
 57. Id. at 7-8. 
 58. Id. at 6, 16. 
 59. Id. at 7-11 (discussing both the circuit court’s decision and the validity of Rule 35). 
 60. Id. at 16. However, the Court reversed the judgment, remanding the case because the 
Federal Rules did not authorize contempt as a sanction for refusing an order pursuant to Rule 35. Id. 
 61. Id. at 11. 
 62. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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whether a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them. 
That the rules in question are such is admitted.”63 
Thus, the Court rejected her argument, but the case is less important 
for its holding than for its method. The majority never discussed whether 
the state rule was substantive; it only found that—consistent with the 
petitioner’s concession—Rule 35 was procedural within the meaning  
of the REA, and, for that reason, it did not transgress the forum  
state’s statute.64 
Justice Felix Frankfurter saw it differently. He agreed with the 
petitioner that the state law privilege, which the Court had recognized 
before the REA, had ancient common law roots.
65
 Justice Frankfurter 
thought this made Rule 35 substantive for REA purposes and a matter of 
policy for Congress to resolve.
66
 He rejected the argument that 
Congress’s acquiescence to the Federal Rules implied a change in that 
policy.
67
 Thus, unlike the majority, he felt compelled to go beyond 
merely considering whether a Federal Rule in the abstract addressed 
substance or procedure, anticipating the Court’s division in Shady Grove 
almost seventy years later.
68
 
In Palmer v. Hoffman,
69
 the issue was whether the plaintiff or the 
defendant had the burden of persuasion with respect to contributory 
negligence.
70
 A state statute required the plaintiff to prove the absence of 
contributory negligence.
71
 The plaintiff argued that, because Federal 
Rule 8(c) made contributory negligence an affirmative defense, the 
burden shifted to the defendant.
72
 The plaintiff’s argument was hardly 
unreasonable; “affirmative defense” ordinarily signifies that the 
defendant has the burden of proof on the issue.
73
 Yet, the unanimous 
Court ruled against the plaintiff.
74
 Once again, the Court’s method, not 
                                                          
 63. Id. at 14. 
 64. Id. at 11, 15-16. 
 65. See id. at 16-17 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id. at 18. 
 67. Id. (“Having due regard to the mechanics of legislation and the practical conditions 
surrounding the business of Congress when the Rules were submitted, to draw any inference of tacit 
approval from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality.”). 
 68. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 69. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
 70. Id. at 116-17. 
 71. Id. at 117-18. 
 72. Id. at 116-17. 
 73. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (9th ed. 2009) (“The defendant bears the 
burden of proving an affirmative defense.”). 
 74. Palmer, 318 U.S. at 117. 
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the result, commands attention: “Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of 
pleading. The question of the burden of establishing contributory 
negligence is a question of local law which federal courts in diversity of 
citizenship cases . . . must apply.”75 Palmer is the first example of the 
Court reading a Federal Rule absolutely literally, refusing to infer from it 
any meaning beyond that explicitly stated.
76
 
Two years later, the Court decided Guaranty Trust and adopted the 
outcome-determinative approach for resolving vertical choice-of-law 
issues.
77
 It took only four years for Guaranty Trust’s draconian effects 
on the Federal Rules to become apparent. A trio of cases in 1949 
rejected applying three Federal Rules, two of which were clearly on 
point.
78
 It became clear that, under Guaranty Trust’s approach, a Federal 
Rule could apply only when it made no difference in the outcome of  
the litigation. 
The critical case was Hanna, and it demands close inspection. 
Hanna departed from Guaranty Trust’s approach to the Federal Rules. 
For the first time, the Court distinguished the vertical choice-of-law 
inquiry in Federal Rules cases from the inquiry that Erie prescribed in 
common law cases.
79
 Hanna held that a court evaluating a Federal Rule 
should test its legitimacy under the REA, not under the RDA,
80
 and that 
made all the difference. The REA and the RDA have radically different 
emphases. The default position under the RDA is that state law applies, 
whereas the REA makes the Federal Rules applicable by default, unless 
they “abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights.”81 The question is 
what sort of inquiry that limiting language compels—a critical issue that 
the Court did not consider until Shady Grove, more than four decades 
later. Cases from Palmer (1943) to Hanna (1965) to Walker (1980) 
                                                          
 75. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 76. Palmer’s method thus anticipated the Court’s approach in both Hanna and Walker. See 
supra notes 48-74 and accompanying text; infra Part III. 
 77. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1944). 
 78. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531 & n.1, 532-33 (1949) 
(rejecting the application of Federal Rule 3); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
550 & n.4, 555-56 (1949) (rejecting the application of Federal Rule 23); Woods v. Interstate Realty 
Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949) (rejecting the application of Rule 17). In Ragan v. Merchants 
Transfer & Warehouse Co., there was a question as to whether Rule 3 actually covered the precise 
issue for which the Court had to make a choice-of-law decision. 337 U.S. at 531 & n.1, 532-33. In 
Walker v. Armco Steel Co., the Court subsequently held that it did not. 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980). 
However, the other two of the three cases—Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. and Woods v. 
Interstate Realty Co.—involved Federal Rules that were unambiguously on point. See 337 U.S. at 
541; 337 U.S. at 535; infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471, 473-74 (1964). 
 80. Id. at 472-74. 
 81. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (creating a default application of state law), with 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (creating a default application of federal law). 
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actually provide the answer, but Shady Grove overlooked the lessons of 
those precedents, and, thus, went astray—making a relatively easy 
problem appear much more difficult.
82
 
III. HANNA V. PLUMER: A NEW ANALYSIS FOR  
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Hanna’s facts were simple. Plaintiff was in an automobile accident 
with defendant’s decedent.83 Plaintiff filed a diversity action in 
Massachusetts against the executor of the other driver’s Massachusetts 
estate.
84
 The process server left a copy of the summons and complaint 
with the executor’s spouse at their residence, in full compliance with 
then-Rule 4(d)(1).
85
 The problem arose because the Federal Rule’s 
service method was incompatible with a Massachusetts statute  
that required personal delivery of process in actions against an  
estate.
86
 The Supreme Court had to decide whether the state or federal 
provision governed.
87
 
The REA analysis was, to say the least, not overly rigorous. The 
Court quoted the test it had articulated in Sibbach—“whether a rule 
really regulates procedure.”88 A rule that governs service seems 
quintessentially procedural, but the Court buttressed that conclusion, 
referring to Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree.
89
 Murphree 
recognized that: 
[M]ost alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may and often 
do affect the rights of litigants. [Congress’s] prohibition of any 
alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed 
                                                          
 82. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 83. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. At the time, the relevant part of Rule 4, describing the method of administering service 
upon a person, read as follows: 
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a 
copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof 
at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion then residing therein . . . .  
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1), in Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United 
States Before the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure 7, 7-8 (1937) (codified as 
amended in FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)). 
 86. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 197, § 9 (West 1958) 
(repealed 2008)). 
 87. The lower federal court had dismissed on the authority of the Massachusetts statute, 
relying, for that choice, on Ragan—one of the trio of cases that applied Guaranty Trust’s outcome-
determinative test to the Federal Rules. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462; supra note 78; infra notes 95-
105 and accompanying text. 
 88. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 462 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 89. 326 U.S. 438 (1946). 
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to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the 
prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, 
agreeably to rules of practice and procedure, have been brought before 
a court authorized to determine their rights.
90
  
Justice John Marshall Harlan agreed, but he urged a more practical 
analysis: asking whether the rule in question would “substantially affect 
those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our 
constitutional system leaves to state regulation.”91 He distinguished what 
one might call real-world conduct from litigation conduct.
92
 His 
approach was more specific than the majority’s, but it was still too vague 
about what constitutes “primary activities.” 
Hanna’s most important contribution was its recognition that the 
RDA and the Erie line of cases are irrelevant to vertical choice-of-law 
problems regarding the Federal Rules.
93
 The Court made a highly 
nuanced distinction concerning Erie’s effect on Federal Rules cases: 
The Erie rule has never been invoked to void a Federal Rule. It is true 
that there have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state 
rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by one 
of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that 
Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent 
state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as 
broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal 
Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the 
enforcement of state law.
94
  
It is critical to understand Erie’s current role in Federal Rules cases. 
It plays no part in deciding what a Federal Rule means, to what 
situations it applies, or whether it violates the REA. If a Federal Rule 
does not apply, either because it is not broad enough or because the court 
determines that it violates the REA, then the absence of a Federal Rule 
creates a vacuum. Only then does the Erie analysis come into play, 
filling the choice-of-law vacuum and directing that state law applies to 
many, but not all, issues.
95
 
                                                          
 90. Id. at 445; see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464-65 (referring to the Court’s decision in 
Murphree). 
 91. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A]ny rule, no matter how clearly 
‘procedural,’ can affect the outcome of litigation if it is not obeyed.”). 
 92. See Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. 
Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision that Added to the Confusion—But Should 
Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1203-04 (2011) [hereinafter Doernberg, The Tempest]. 
 93. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469-70 (majority opinion). 
 94. Id. at 470. 
 95. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1958) (demonstrating 
the exception that state rules cannot disrupt the judge-jury relationship in federal courts); supra 
2014] HOW THE FEDERAL COURTS UNDERSTAND THE FRCP 811 
Some of Hanna’s less sweeping language applies to the REA 
problem: “[T]he clash [between the Federal Rule and the state rule] is 
unavoidable; Rule 4(d)(1) says—implicitly, but with unmistakable 
clarity—that in-hand service is not required in the federal courts.”96 
Later, the Court characterized the conflict as a “direct collision with the 
law of the relevant State.”97 The Court noted that it had not previously 
considered a case with such a direct conflict, and that the circuit courts 
had anticipated Hanna’s approach.98 Lower federal courts99 and 
secondary sources have since uniformly recognized that a direct 
collision is necessary for a Federal Rule to oust a conflicting  
state rule.
100
 
 
 
                                                          
notes 35-40 and accompanying text; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 
437 (1996) (holding that state law may define the monetary limits of recovery, but federal law 
governs which part of the federal judiciary evaluates the question). There are also cases involving 
law that is substantive by any measure, but the Court has required the use of a federal common law 
rule. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (approving the Fourth 
Circuit’s creation of a federal-contractors’ defense to a state tort action); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) (approving the use of a judicially generated act of state 
doctrine in a state contract case). I have previously suggested that the vertical choice-of-law 
problem yields to a different analysis from the one that the Court has articulated. Doernberg, The 
Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 657-60. If one begins by presuming that state law applies to every 
issue in every case in the federal courts, the presumption is rebuttable only by the existence of a 
dominant federal interest—a federal constitutional rule, statute, or other rule—any of which 
displace conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; Doernberg, 
The Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 657-60. I stand by that analysis, but it does not purport to deal 
with the quite distinct question of whether a Federal Rule is consistent with the REA. See 
Doernberg, The Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 659-61. 
 96. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470. 
 97. Id. at 472; see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4 (1987) (“The initial step is 
to determine whether, when fairly construed, the scope of [the Federal Rule] is sufficiently broad to 
cause a direct collision with the state law . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 & n.9 (1980), and Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-72)). 
 98. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-73. 
 99. See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1276-77 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(choosing state law where there was no direct conflict between a state statute and a Federal Rule); 
Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 42 F.3d 948, 950-51 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding direct conflict between state 
law and the Federal Rules, and finding that applying the Federal Rule was constitutional and within 
the scope of the REA); Robinson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 840, 842-43 (N.D. 
Ohio 2010) (citing the Court’s decision in Hanna as requiring a direct-collision between state law 
and the Federal Rules, and applying the relevant Federal Rule). 
 100. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 330-31 (5th ed. 2007); JACK H. 
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 222 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that the court must act within 
the scope of power authorized by the REA when there is a “direct conflict” between the state 
practice and a Federal Rule); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 92 (6th ed. 
2011); LARRY R. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 484 (4th ed. 2009); CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 403 (7th ed. 2011) (noting the 
difficulty in the choice between state law and a Federal Rule where there is no direct conflict). 
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Walker exemplifies how direct the collision must be. In Walker, the 
petitioner sued in diversity to recover for personal injuries.
101
 The state 
statute of limitations period required commencement of the action within 
two years of the claim’s accrual.102 State law mandated that an action 
commenced for statute-of-limitations purposes upon service—not 
filing—of the summons and complaint.103 The petitioner filed within the 
two-year period, but service did not occur until months after the 
limitations period expired.
104
 The only relevant Federal Rule said 
nothing about statutes of limitations: “A civil action is commenced by 
filing a complaint with the Court.”105 The district court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for untimeliness, and the circuit court 
affirmed.
106
 The unanimous Supreme Court traced the development of 
the vertical choice-of-law doctrine with respect to procedural rules, 
characterizing Hanna as requiring that “the Federal Rule [is] clearly 
applicable,” and as requiring a “direct collision” that is “unavoidable.”107 
Federal Rule 3 did not speak of the event that stops the running of a 
limitations period: “There is no indication that the Rule was intended to 
toll a state statute of limitations, much less that it purported to displace 
state tolling rules for purposes of state statutes of limitations.”108 The 
Court explained: 
Since there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the state 
law, the Hanna analysis does not apply. Instead, the policies behind 
Erie and Ragan [v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.]
109
 control 
the issue whether, in the absence of a federal rule directly on point, 
state service requirements which are an integral part of the state statute 
of limitations should control in [a diversity] action . . . .
110
 
                                                          
 101. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 741 (1980). 
 102. Id. at 742-43. 
 103. Id. Service was good if made within sixty days of timely filing. Id. at 743. The Oklahoma 
statute (since repealed) provided in pertinent part: 
An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the commencement 
thereof, within the meaning of this article, when the party faithfully, properly and 
diligently endeavors to procure a service; But such attempt must be followed by the first 
publication or Service of the summons, or if service is sought to be procured by mailing, 
by a receipt of certified mail containing summons, Within sixty (60) days.  
Lake v. Lietch, 550 P.2d 935, 937 (Okla. 1976) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 97 (1971) (repealed 
1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Walker, 446 U.S. at 742. 
 105. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
 106. Walker, 446 U.S. at 743-44. 
 107. Id. at 748-49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 108. Id. at 750-51 (footnote omitted). 
 109. 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 110. Walker, 446 U.S. at 752-53 (footnote omitted). 
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Hanna and Walker thus require read-my-lips clarity from a Federal Rule 
on the precise vertical choice-of-law issue before the Federal Rule can 
displace state law. Hanna had it; Walker did not.
111
 
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods
112
 echoed Hanna and 
distinguished Walker. The issue was whether an unsuccessful appellant 
in a diversity case was subject to the forum state’s mandatory 
affirmance-penalty statute
113
 or to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
38, which vests the federal appellate court with discretion to impose 
penalties.
114
 The unanimous Court reiterated the Hanna-Walker 
standard, “whether, when fairly construed, the scope of [the Federal 
Rule] is ‘sufficiently broad’ to cause a ‘direct collision’ with the state 
law or, implicitly, to ‘control the issue’ before the court, thereby leaving 
no room for the operation of that law.”115 The Court emphasized that it 
clearly intended Rule 38 to penalize only frivolous appeals, whereas the 
state statute penalized “every unsuccessful appeal, regardless of 
merit.”116 Burlington recognized an unmistakable conflict between the 
two provisions. Rule 38 was within Congress’s power to regulate federal 
procedure, which the REA had delegated to the Supreme Court, so the 
state statute could not apply. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 111. The lower federal courts have followed that explicitness approach. See, e.g., Robinson v. 
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 724 F. Supp. 2d 840, 843 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (finding that Walker calls for 
a plain-meaning reading of the Federal Rules, and eschewing the notion that the lower court is 
required to construe Federal Rules narrowly to avoid direct collisions); Schach v. Ford Motor Co., 
210 F.R.D. 522, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (noting that, since Rule 3 plainly fails to address tolling of 
limitations periods, state rules apply). 
 112. 480 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 113. Id. at 2; see also ALA. CODE § 12-22-72 (2012). The Alabama Code states: 
When a judgment or decree is entered or rendered for money, whether debt or damages, 
and the same has been stayed on appeal by the execution of bond, with surety, if the 
appellate court affirms the judgment of the court below, it must also enter judgment 
against all or any of the obligors on the bond for the amount of the affirmed judgment, 
and the costs of the appellate court . . . .  
ALA. CODE § 12-22-72. 
 114. FED. R. APP. P. 38 (“If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, 
after a separately filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, 
award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.”). 
 115. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 4-5 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50, and Hanna v. Plumer, 
380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)). In holding that Rule 38 governed, the Court relied heavily on Affholder, 
Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc., 746 F.2d 305, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1984), which refused to apply an 
analogous statute from another state. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 6-7. 
 116. Burlington, 480 U.S. at 6 (citing Affholder, 746 F.2d at 308-09). 
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The following table illustrates the Court’s approach with respect to 
the Federal Rules:  
 
Table 1 
 
Case Issue State Rule Federal 
Rule 
Choice Rationale 
Hanna How must 
service of 
process on 
an executor 
occur? 
In-hand 
delivery 
only 
Fed. R.  
Civ. P. 4: 
substituted 
service 
permitted 
Federal Rule 4 
clashes 
directly with 
the state rule 
and involves 
only 
procedure 
Walker What event 
stops the 
statute of 
limitations 
from 
running? 
Service of 
process on 
the 
defendant 
Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 3: “A  
case is 
commenced 
by the filing 
of a 
complaint” 
State Rule 3 is 
silent on 
statutes of 
limitation—
it is not 
directly on 
point; it does 
not govern 
Burlington Does a 
mandatory 
penalty 
apply to an 
unsuccessful 
appellant 
who has 
gotten a stay 
of execution 
of the 
judgment 
pending 
appeal? 
Automatic 
penalty of 
ten percent 
of the 
judgment 
plus 
appellate 
costs 
Fed. R. 
App. P. 38: 
Court of 
Appeals has 
discretion 
to impose 
penalty for 
frivolous 
appeals 
Federal Rule 38 
directly 
clashes with 
the state 
rule—state 
law cannot 
control the 
internal 
workings of 
the federal 
courts 
(similar to 
Byrd) 
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Note that this is not the approach that the Court requires or uses with 
respect to federal statutes. Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.
117
 
provides a good example of the difference. The parties contracted for 
plaintiff to market defendant’s copiers.118 Plaintiff was an Alabama 
corporation; defendant was incorporated in Delaware and had its 
principal place of business in New Jersey.
119
 The contract contained both 
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses.
120
 The choice-of-forum 
clause specified a state or federal court in Manhattan.
121
 When a dispute 
arose, plaintiff sued in a federal court in Alabama, and defendant moved 
for transfer to the Southern District of New York.
122
 The district court 
denied the transfer motion because “Alabama looks unfavorably upon 
contractual forum-selection clauses.”123 The circuit court reversed.124 
The Supreme Court majority, as had the Eleventh Circuit, 
characterized the problem as an issue of venue.
125
 Having done that, it 
                                                          
 117. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. (Stewart Org. I), 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 118. Id. at 24. 
 119. Id.; Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 3, Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (No. 86-
1908). 
 120. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. (Stewart Org. II), 810 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(per curiam), aff’d, 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
 121. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 24. The Eleventh Circuit found: 
Dealer and Ricoh agree that any appropriate state or federal district court located in the 
Borough of Manhattan, New York City, New York, shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
over any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this Agreement and 
shall be a proper forum in which to adjudicate such case or controversy. 
Id. at 24 n.1. 
 122. Id. at 24. 
 123. Id. The district court relied on Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554 (Ala. 
1980), abrogated by Professional Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347 (1997). See Stewart Org. 
II, 810 F.2d at 1073 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). In Redwing Carriers, the relevant contract provision 
purported to specify the venue for disputes. 382 So. 2d at 555. The Alabama Supreme Court, 
however, read the provision as an attempt to limit Alabama courts’ jurisdiction: 
  In the instant case the agreement does not govern venue, rather it waives the 
jurisdictional privilege of any domicile that the parties may be entitled to, divesting all 
courts of the power to hear and determine the cause except the courts of Hillsborough 
County, Florida. 
. . . . 
  We consider contract provisions which attempt to limit the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this state to be invalid and unenforceable as being contrary to public policy.  
Id. at 556. The contractual provision in Stewart Org. II appears to fit the Alabama Supreme Court’s 
mold even more precisely than the provision that this Alabama court was considering. See supra 
note 116. Nonetheless, the federal court in Stewart Org. II read it differently. See Stewart Org. II, 
810 F.2d at 1069-70. 
 124. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 25. 
 125. See Stewart Org. II, 810 F.2d at 1067-68; see also Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 28 
(referring to “the parties’ venue dispute”). Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting, vigorously contested 
this characterization, viewing the matter instead as a dispute over the validity of the forum-selection 
clause: 
[T]he Court’s description of the issue begs the question: what law governs whether the 
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was a small step for the Court to find that section 1404 also concerned 
venue: “This question involves a straightforward exercise in statutory 
interpretation to determine if the statute covers the point in dispute”—
and, accordingly, the Court concluded that the statute did.
126
 That 
conclusion is unimportant for present purposes. The Court’s method of 
construing the statute, however, is critical.“We believe that the statute, 
fairly construed, does cover the point in dispute.”127 The Court noted that 
it had already construed section 1404 to vest district courts with case-by-
case discretion about whether to transfer a case. Justice Thurgood 
Marshall noted that a forum-selection clause might be a powerful 
consideration in the exercise of that discretion. “The flexible and 
individualized analysis Congress prescribed in [section] 1404 thus 
encompasses consideration of the parties’ private expression of their 
venue preferences.”128 
                                                          
forum-selection clause is a valid or invalid allocation of any inconvenience between the 
parties. If it is invalid, i.e. should be voided, between the parties, it cannot be entitled to 
any weight in the § 1404(a) determination. Since under Alabama law the forum-selection 
clause should be voided . . . in this case the question of what weight should be given can 
be reached only if as a preliminary matter federal law controls the issue of the validity of 
the clause between the parties.  
Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Pointing out that state law 
almost invariably controls issues of contract validity, Justice Scalia argued that there was no 
dominant federal interest, therefore, no reason to displace the state law that made the clause invalid. 
See id.; Doernberg, The Unseen Track, supra note 7, at 645, 647, 658-59. Justice Scalia also argued 
that the policy underlying vertical choice-of-law doctrine in general supported his approach. Stewart 
Org. I, 487 U.S. at 39 (noting that Hanna emphasized “discouragement of forum-shopping” as one 
of Erie’s aims (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). The Court in Hanna had observed: “Though choice of the federal or state rule will at this 
point have a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference between the two rules 
would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum.” Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469. In Stewart 
Org. I, it was easy to see that the difference in the federal and state approaches would affect the 
choice of forum. See Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 24 (majority opinion). There seems little doubt 
that, if the case had proceeded in the Alabama state courts, the defendant could not have relied 
successfully on the choice-of-forum clause. See id. Thus, even had plaintiff filed there, defendant 
would have had enormous incentive to remove and then to seek transfer. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 
1441 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
  Justice Scalia had a strong point, despite the disagreement of the other eight justices. 
Nonetheless, for purposes of this Article, the critical issue is how the Court interpreted § 1404 for 
vertical choice-of-law purposes, not whether it should have been looking at that section at all. 
 126. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 26. 
 127. Id. at 29. 
 128. Id. at 29-30. That may well be true, but, as Justice Scalia pointed out, perhaps the Court’s 
first consideration should have been whether the clause was part of the contract under state law in 
the first place. See supra note 123. Alabama law seemed to say it was not. See Stewart Org. I, 487 
U.S. at 24. That does not necessarily mean that the district court should have granted defendant’s 
motion, but, if Justice Scalia’s description of Alabama law was accurate, then the district court 
would have had to find some other basis on which to rest a transfer order, and none was apparent in 
this case. After all, defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 
New Jersey, plaintiff was an Alabama corporation operating only in Alabama, and there was no 
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The important thing is what the Court did not do. It did not rely 
exclusively on the statute’s wording, but rather considered what it 
inferred to be congressional intent, as well.
129
 Section 1404 says nothing 
explicit about forum-selection clauses; it merely states general 
considerations to which a forum-selection clause may be relevant.
130
 
Contrast the Court’s inferential approach to the statute with its literal 
approach to Rule 3 in Walker.
131
 Rule 3 says nothing about stopping 
statutes of limitation from running, and the Court refused to read it to 
have any such effect in diversity cases.
132
 Arguably, the case for giving 
Rule 3 the effect Walker urged was considerably stronger, because 
Rule 3 does prescribe the stopping point in cases governed by federal 
statutes of limitation.
133
 But because Rule 3 was silent on the limitations 
issue, the Walker Court ruled that it did not apply in diversity cases.
134
 
Parallel treatment in Stewart would have resulted in the conclusion that 
section 1404, silent on the issue of forum-selection clauses, also did not 
control. Finally, if Walker had used the Stewart approach, it might well 
have found that Rule 3, which does specify the event that stops federal 
limitations periods, had the same effect on state limitations periods in 
diversity cases.
135
 
Thus, the Court treats statutes differently from Federal Rules for 
vertical choice-of-law purposes. It looks to congressional intent and 
                                                          
apparent connection between the contract and New York. Id. 
 129. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 29-30. 
 130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404. 
 131. Compare Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. at 29-30 (considering inferred congressional intent), 
with Walker v. Armco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980) (requiring a literal interpretation of Rule 
3); see also supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text. 
 132. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51 & n.10. 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285, 287-89 (6th Cir. 1978); Bomar v. Keyes, 
162 F.2d 136, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1947). The requirements of Rule 3 are also described in David D. 
Siegel, Practice Commentary, 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 3 cmt. (2008). Siegel explains: 
  Rule 3 provides the rule of federal practice that the filing of the complaint marks the 
commencement of the action. The moment of filing is the key time to look to determine 
whether the statute of limitations has been satisfied. As long as the complaint has been 
filed on or before the last day—the assumption would run—the action is timely and the 
summons and complaint can be served at any time during the 120 days that follow. (The 
120-period comes from Rule 4[j].) 
  The foregoing is true enough as a general principle when jurisdiction is based on a 
federal question, or any other ground of jurisdiction except diversity of citizenship. 
When diversity is the jurisdictional basis for the federal action, however, Rule 3 
emphatically does not govern for purposes of the statute of limitations. The rule 
applicable in a diversity case to determine whether the statute of limitations has been 
satisfied is taken from the law of the state in which the federal court happens to be 
sitting.  
Id. 
 134. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51 & n.10. 
 135. See discussion supra notes 121-25 & accompanying text. 
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makes inferences from federal statutes in this area, just as it does in other 
areas. But it will not draw inferences from a Federal Rule; instead 
requiring explicitness if the Rule is to apply.
136
 Stewart muddied that 
distinction to some extent because of its reliance on Walker and Hanna, 
but, although it referred to the “direct collision” language of both cases, 
it did not find a direct collision between the language of section 1404 
and the Alabama rule.
137
 Justice Marshall’s opinion tacitly 
acknowledged the difference: “[T]he ‘direct collision’ language, at least 
where the applicability of a federal statute is at issue, expresses the 
requirement that the federal statute be sufficiently broad to cover the 
point in dispute.”138 There would have been no reason to make the 
distinction if the Court intended to use the same approach with statutes 
and the Federal Rules. 
The distinction makes sense. The REA limits the Federal Rules by 
specifying that the Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”139 No similar limitation applies to Congress’s 
legislative powers; as long as Congress acts within its delegated powers, 
it can, and often does, alter substantive rights, abolishing some and 
creating others. That is what the Federal Rules cannot do, and a 
structural reason underlies that limitation. 
The Court, not Congress, creates and promulgates the Federal 
Rules.
140
 Congress has effectively retained a veto power, but the Rules 
are the Court’s.141 Whereas Congress is a majoritarian body, the federal 
courts are counter-majoritarian. Therefore, the REA keeps the federal 
judiciary from regulating substance, a majoritarian concern, in the guise 
of regulating the federal courts’ internal procedure. 
                                                          
 136. There is one case in which the Court held that apparently explicit language did not compel 
application of the relevant Federal Rule. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 
497, 505-06 (2001). Semtek concerned the meaning of Federal Rule 41(b), specifically its language 
about dismissal “operat[ing] as an adjudication on the merits.” Id. at 505 (citing FED. R. CIV. 
P. 41(b)). The Court concluded that the language did not mean that, in a case dismissed as untimely, 
res judicata prevented the plaintiff from filing in another forum with a longer statute. Id. at 509. 
Note, however, that Semtek is a case where even language one might characterize as read-my-lips 
clear might not cause a Federal Rule to apply. See id. at 505-06, 509. It has nothing to say about the 
propriety of going beyond the explicit language of a Federal Rule to expand its area of application. 
 137. Stewart Org. I, 487 U.S. 22, 26 & n.4 (1987). 
 138. Id. at 26 n.4. 
 139. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
 140. Id. § 2072(a). 
 141. See id. § 2074(a) (“Such rule shall take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in 
which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise provided by law.”). Congress occasionally 
exercises that power, most notably with respect to the Court’s first submission of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence in 1973. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. See generally John 
Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974) (discussing the problems 
with regard to the application of the Erie doctrine to both statutory and constitutional interpretation). 
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In Ragan, Hanna, and Walker, no one argued that Rules 3 and 4 
established new substantive rights or abolished old ones. The Rules were 
substantive only in the crabbed sense of Guaranty Trust, which declared 
a federal rule substantive if the choice of a state or federal rule was 
outcome determinative. Recall that Guaranty Trust itself did not concern 
a Federal Rule; it dealt instead with laches. To say, as later courts did, 
that a Federal Rule would have a forbidden substantive effect if applying 
it was outcome determinative was a considerable over-reading of 
Guaranty Trust. Hanna reflected that distinction: 
[T]here have been cases where this Court has held applicable a state 
rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by one 
of the Federal Rules. But the holding of each such case was not that 
Erie commanded displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent 
state rule, but rather that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as 
broad as the losing party urged, and therefore, there being no Federal 
Rule which covered the point in dispute, Erie commanded the 
enforcement of state law.
142
 
Now, if any court other than the Supreme Court had taken such a 
position, the laughter would not even have been muffled because Cohen 
v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
143
 involved a Rule arguably on point, 
and the very same day, two other cases the Court decided—Woods v. 
Interstate Realty Co.
144
 and Ragan—involved Federal Rules 
unambiguously on point.
145
 
Cohen was a shareholder’s derivative suit wherein the plaintiff held 
a minuscule percentage of the corporate shares.
146
 While the case was 
pending in a New Jersey state court, the New Jersey legislature enacted a 
law requiring shareholders with small holdings to post a bond to 
indemnify the corporation for “the reasonable expenses, including 
counsel fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such action 
and by the other parties defendant in connection therewith for which  
it may become subject,” in the event that the derivative action  
was unsuccessful.
147
 
                                                          
 142. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1965). 
 143. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 144. 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
 145. See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531-33 (1949); Cohen, 
337 U.S. at 555-56; Woods, 337 U.S. at 536. 
 146. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 543-44. 
 147. Id. at 544 & n.1 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 to -17 (West 1946) (repealed 1968)). 
The statute applied to shareholders with holdings of less than five percent or $50,000 of corporate 
shares. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 to -17. The Court ruled that the statute’s imposition of the 
security burden only on shareholders with a limited financial interest did not violate the Due Process 
Clause. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 551-52. 
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The New Jersey bond requirement was potentially inconsistent with 
then-Rule 23.
148
 Although the Rule prescribed requirements for 
derivative actions, it did not require a bond.
149
 The Court found that the 
state law had a substantive purpose—limiting strike suits by 
shareholders with little to lose—and was, therefore, more than simply a 
procedural rule to control litigation in New Jersey courts.
150
 All of the 
explicit requirements of Rule 23 could apply to the case without 
conflicting with the New Jersey statute. Thus, the majority refused to 
read Rule 23’s silence to oust the state-imposed bond requirement. In 
this respect, Hanna’s characterization is accurate. 
Justice Frankfurter, the author of Guaranty Trust, joined Justice 
William O. Douglas’s dissent on this point.151 They argued that the New 
Jersey bond requirement for a shareholder’s derivative action “does not 
add one iota to nor subtract one iota from that cause of action. It merely 
prescribes the method by which stockholders may enforce it.”152 Thus, 
the dissent focused only on the elements of the shareholder’s cause  
of action, and finding that the security requirement addressed none of 
them, deemed it procedural for vertical choice-of-law purposes and  
therefore inapplicable.
153
 
Woods involved a state rule that forbade unregistered corporations 
doing business in the state to sue in the state courts.
154
 Mississippi courts 
had construed the law as governing only the capacity to sue, rather than 
the validity of any underlying contract.
155
 Nonetheless, the majority 
ruled that the state law closed the federal courts also, preventing a 
diversity case from having an outcome different from what would have 
happened in the state courts.
156
 The Court’s short majority opinion never 
                                                          
 148. See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 551-52, 555-57. 
 149. See id. at 555-57. 
 150. Id. at 556. “A suit (esp[ecially] a derivative action), often based on no valid claim, 
brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). 
 151. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.; see Doernberg, The Tempest, supra note 92, at 1185-92 (discussing an “elements” 
approach and a “behavioral” approach to construing the Federal Rules for REA purposes). 
 154. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 536 & n.1 (1949). 
 155. Id. at 539 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Robert H. Jackson’s dissent explains: 
  The [state] statute follows a pattern general among the states in requiring 
qualification and payment of fees by foreign corporations. State courts have generally 
held such Acts to do no more than to withhold state help from the noncomplying 
corporation but to leave their rights otherwise unimpaired. This interpretation left such 
corporations a basis on which to get the help of any other court—federal or state—that 
could otherwise take jurisdiction . . . . 
Id. 
 156. See id. at 537-38 (majority opinion). 
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so much as mentioned Federal Rule 17, which spoke directly to a party’s 
capacity as a litigant and contained no disqualification.
157
 Justice Robert 
H. Jackson’s dissent also failed to mention Rule 17, focusing instead on 
the impropriety of federal courts giving state laws greater effect than the 
states themselves did.
158
 It is, therefore, quite a stretch to say, as  
Hanna did, that Woods construed Rule 17. Woods did not construe it; it 
ignored it. 
Ragan, like Hanna and Walker, involved service of process. It 
resembles Walker (when to serve process) more than Hanna (how to 
serve process). Ragan filed a federal complaint stating a negligence 
claim within the two-year period that Kansas law allowed.
159
 Service, 
however, did not occur until almost four months later, and almost three 
months after the two-year period ended.
160
 The defendant sought 
summary judgment for untimeliness, and succeeded in the Tenth Circuit 
despite plaintiff’s argument that Rule 3 defined commencement as the 
time that he had filed, not served, the complaint.
161
 The Supreme Court 
adopted the Tenth Circuit’s view that under Kansas law, only service, 
not filing, commenced the action.
162
 “[The] local law undertook to 
determine the life of the cause of action. We cannot give it a longer life 
in the federal court than it would have had in the state court without  
 
                                                          
 157. See id. at 535-59; FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b) (1946) (amended 1948). Federal Rule 17(b) 
stated: 
Capacity to Sue or be Sued. The capacity of an individual, other than the one acting in a 
representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. 
The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under 
which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined 
by the law of the State in which the district court is held; except (1) that a partnership or 
other unincorporated association, which has no such capacity by the name of such State, 
may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a 
substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that 
the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the United States to sue or be sued in a 
court of the United States is governed by Rule 66. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b). 
 158. Woods, 337 U.S. at 538-40 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 159. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531 (1949); see KAN. GEN. 
STATS. 1935, § 60-306. 
 160. See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 531. 
 161. See id. at 532. “A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 3. 
 162. See Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532-34; see also KAN. GEN. STATS. 1935, § 60-308 (“An action 
shall be deemed commenced within the meaning of this article, as to each defendant, at the date of 
the summons which is served on him . . . .”). Although Ragan obviously viewed it differently, one 
could read the Kansas statute to be consistent with Rule 3, because the statute refers to “the date of 
the summons,” not the date of the service. See § 60-308. But the Tenth Circuit, in an opinion that 
the Supreme Court noted “a distinguished member of the Kansas bar” had written, read it 
differently. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 534. 
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adding something to the cause of action. We may not do that 
consistently with Erie . . . .”163 
In Ragan, the clash between state rules and the Federal Rule was 
direct: each specified the date of commencement of a civil action. The 
Court’s selection of the state definition is, perhaps, not surprising since, 
by its terms, it applied to the limitations period in Ragan. It is a bit 
surprising that the Court never discussed the scope of Rule 3. It simply 
relied on Guaranty Trust in finding that using Rule 3 would produce a 
different result in federal court from the outcome that would result in 
state court, thus violating Erie. There was no mention of the REA; the 
Court passed up the opportunity to explore whether applying Rule 3 
would have violated the REA. Ragan clearly rests on Guaranty Trust, 
not on the REA or any narrowing construction of Rule 3, so Hanna’s 
view of Ragan—as a case construing Rule 3—is as inaccurate as 
Hanna’s view of Woods. 
Hanna criticized Ragan for misunderstanding the proper inquiry.
164
 
Hanna’s contribution to the vertical choice-of-law issue was recognizing 
that the analytical technique of Erie, Guaranty Trust, and Byrd is 
entirely inapplicable to: (1) the scope of a Federal Rule and (2) whether 
a Federal Rule contravenes the REA.
165
 That is what some of the justices 
who decided Shady Grove forgot. 
IV. SHADY GROVE’S UMBRA 
Shady Grove is a difficult case to digest. New York requires 
automobile insurers to pay no-fault insurance claims within thirty days 
of receipt, or to pay two percent per month interest on the delayed 
amount plus reasonable attorney’s fees.166 Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates (“Shady Grove”) claimed that Allstate Insurance Company 
(“Allstate”) improperly delayed payment and owed approximately five 
hundred dollars in interest.
167
 Normally, the diversity jurisdiction 
                                                          
 163. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533-34. 
 164. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476-77 (1965). 
 165. That is not to say that the Erie analysis is inapplicable to any procedural question. If there 
is no Federal Rule directly on point, or if there is such a Rule but the Court determines that the Rule 
violates the limiting language of the REA, then the Erie analysis becomes appropriate. See supra 
notes 86-94 and accompanying text. The Erie analysis operates only when there is a vacuum of 
positive federal law—where no constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision governs the issue. 
See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Then, and then only, the question becomes whether the 
federal court should create federal common law, and the Erie analysis, as developed in the 
subsequent cases, addresses that question. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 166. N.Y. INS. LAW § 5106(a) (McKinney 2009). 
 167. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006), aff’d, 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). As the district court 
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statute
168
 would bar the federal courts from hearing such a small claim, 
but Shady Grove had filed a federal class action under diversity 
jurisdiction, alleging “that Allstate routinely fails to pay covered claims 
for first-party no-fault benefits within the statutorily mandated time 
period and routinely ignores its obligation to pay the statutory interest 
owed in such cases.”169 Pleading a class action raised the amount in 
controversy to more than five million dollars, which allowed Shady 
Grove to file in federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act 
(“CAFA”).170 The problem arose because a provision of New York’s 
Civil Practice Law and Rules—section 901(b)—forbade maintenance of 
New York class actions to recover penalties.
171
 Both the district and 
circuit courts viewed the interest provision as a penalty, and, therefore, 
refused class certification.
172
 
The Supreme Court confronted two issues: (1) what the analytical 
technique should be, and (2) what the result in the case should be. Each 
issue produced a five-to-four majority vote, but the majorities’ 
membership shifted. Even within each majority there were serious 
differences. Five justices agreed that the class action could proceed,
 
but 
Justice John Paul Stevens differed with Justice Antonin Scalia’s plurality 
about the appropriate analytical method.
173
 Four other justices disagreed 
                                                          
recited, Allstate eventually paid the underlying claims, but withheld the interest payments it 
allegedly owed under the statute. See id. 
 168. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 169. Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 470. 
 170. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006); see Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 & n.3. Unlike the 
stringent requirements of general diversity jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction under the CAFA 
requires only minimal diversity of the parties as long as at least five million dollars is in 
controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent specifically accused Shady Grove 
of “attempt[ing] to transform a $500 case into a $5,000,000 award.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 
1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). There is a certain irresistible irony to the CAFA’s operation, as 
Justice Ginsburg described it. One of Congress’s clear purposes in enacting the CAFA was to make 
it possible for class action defendants to remove such actions from state “magnet jurisdictions” to 
the federal courts. See generally Symposium, Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008) (discussing the purposes and impact of the 
CAFA). In Shady Grove, the CAFA had the (probably) unintended effect of making the federal 
court the magnet jurisdiction. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 & n.3. Adding to the irony, the 
United States is a magnet jurisdiction for international cases. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, The 
United States as a Magnet Forum and What, if Anything, to Do About It, in INTERNATIONAL 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 213, 216 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 
1997). 
 171. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 2006) (“Unless a statute creating or imposing a 
penalty, or a minimum measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a class 
action, an action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or imposed by 
statute may not be maintained as a class action.”). 
 172. See Shady Grove, 549 F.3d at 146; Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 471, 473. 
 173. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-37, 1442-44. Justice Scalia announced the judgment 
and wrote a majority opinion with respect to the facts of the case, its procedural history, and the 
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both with the result and with Justice Scalia’s analytical method.174 
Justice Stevens agreed with the dissent on method, but was unable to 
agree on how it applied in Shady Grove.
175
 
The split over the proper technique commands attention. Justice 
Scalia approached the REA issue from the federal side, looking only at 
Rule 23, not at state law, to decide whether Rule 23 was substantive 
within the meaning of the REA. “What matters is what the rule itself 
regulates: If it governs only ‘the manner and means’ by which the 
litigants’ rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision 
by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.”176 Justice 
Scalia thus ruled out considering whether the conflicting state law had a 
substantive purpose. In Shady Grove, the state rule may have reflected a 
substantive policy, that is, the legislature’s desire to avoid penalty cases 
                                                          
unavoidability of a direct clash between Federal Rule 23 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 901(b)—and, 
hence, the necessity of evaluating Rule 23 under the REA. Id. at 1436-42. Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justices Stevens, Justice Thomas, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in that view. Id. 
The remainder of his opinion discussed the proper technique for making REA evaluations. Id. at 
1442-44. The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Sotomayor joined Part II-B and II-D of the 
opinion. See id. Only the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas joined Part II-C, which was a reply to 
Justice Stevens’s partial concurrence and concurrence in the judgment. Id. at 1444-48. Justice 
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito, wrote an 
extended dissent. See id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 174. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436-42 (majority opinion). Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined 
by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. See id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 175. See id. at 1463 n.2. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, “a majority of this Court, it bears 
emphasis, agrees that Federal Rules should be read with moderation in diversity suits to 
accommodate important state interests.” Id. See generally Symposium, Erie Under Advisement: The 
Doctrine After Shady Grove, 44 AKRON L. REV. 897 (2011) (containing several articles discussing 
the Shady Grove opinions in depth). 
 176. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (majority opinion) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). Note, however, that Justice Scalia’s position in Semtek Int’l 
Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. seems more nuanced than Shady Grove’s simple statement. 531 U.S. 
497 (2001). Semtek, begun in the California state courts and then removed by the defendant, 
suffered dismissal in the district and circuit courts because the plaintiff had overrun California’s 
two-year limitation period. Id. at 499. The district court specified that it was dismissing plaintiff’s 
claims—under Federal Rule 41(b)—“in [their] entirety on the merits and with prejudice.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The issue was whether that designation precluded litigation in 
Maryland, which had a longer limitations period. Id. The Court ruled that it did not, notwithstanding 
Rule 41(b)’s apparently clear language. Id. at 509. Justice Scalia declined to take the Rule’s 
wording at face value: “[I]t would be peculiar to find a rule governing the effect that must be 
accorded federal judgments by other courts ensconced in rules governing the internal procedures of 
the rendering court itself.” Id. at 503. Justice Scalia also added a statement that seems at odds with 
his later position in Shady Grove: “Indeed, such a rule would arguably violate the jurisdictional 
limitation of the Rules Enabling Act.” Id. Perhaps so, but Rule 41(b) contains nothing with respect 
to “the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,” because, as Justice 
Scalia himself pointed out, “the traditional rule is that expiration of the applicable statute of 
limitations merely bars the remedy and does not extinguish the substantive right, so that dismissal 
on that ground does not have claim-preclusive effect in other jurisdictions with longer, unexpired 
limitations periods.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442; Semtek, 531 U.S. at 504. 
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inflicting ruinous damages on a party.
177
 For Justice Scalia and his three 
colleagues, “the substantive nature of New York’s law, or its substantive 
purpose, makes no difference.”178 The issue was not whether the state 
law is substantive, but rather whether the Federal Rule is. Rule 23 
addresses nothing substantive—no elements of a cause of action or 
defense on the merits
179—and, therefore, it does not violate the REA. 
The other five justices saw it differently. They declined to say 
whether a Federal Rule has a REA-impermissible effect without first 
looking at the state rules and the extent to which they embody or reflect 
substantive state policies. On that principle the five were united, but  
they were unable to agree that section 901(b) represented a substantive 
state policy. 
Justice Stevens concluded that New York’s limitation was, for  
REA purposes, procedural only.
180
 He diverged from Justice Scalia, 
asserting that: 
  It is important to observe that the balance Congress has struck [in 
the RDA and REA] turns, in part, on the nature of the state law that is 
being displaced by a federal rule. And in my view, the application of 
that balance does not necessarily turn on whether the state law at issue 
takes the form of what is traditionally described as substantive or 
procedural. Rather, it turns on whether the state law actually is part of 
a State’s framework of substantive rights and remedies.
181
 
For Justice Stevens, it was appropriate to focus both on the state and 
federal laws. Federal Rule 23 clearly covered whether Shady Grove 
could maintain its suit as a class action.
182
 Therefore, he, like Justice 
Scalia’s plurality, had to consider whether applying Rule 23 would 
violate the REA. Justice Scalia’s plurality had only to read Rule 23 to 
make that decision.
183
 Justice Stevens apparently thought that approach 
was unrealistic because it considered the scope of the Federal Rule as if 
the Rule operated in a vacuum. In his view, the REA’s limitation 
                                                          
 177. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted that there were several indications that the New York 
legislature had substantive goals in mind when it enacted section 901(b). See Shady Grove, 130 
S. Ct. at 1465-66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing Governor Hugh Carey’s signing statement 
and the practice commentaries). Justice Scalia disputed the evidence. See id. at 1440 (majority 
opinion) (“This evidence of the New York Legislature’s purpose is pretty sparse.”). 
 178. Id. at 1444. 
 179. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text. 
 180. “The New York law at issue . . . is a procedural rule that is not part of New York’s 
substantive law.” Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 181. Id. at 1449. 
 182. See id. at 1456-57. 
 183. See id. at 1437 (majority opinion). 
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compelled examining the state law to see whether applying the Federal 
Rule would “abridge, enlarge or modify” some substantive right.184 In 
effect, though not explicitly, Justice Scalia’s plurality thought that the 
REA required evaluating a Federal Rule only on its face, whereas Justice 
Stevens wanted to consider REA challenges on an as-applied basis.
185
 
Several factors persuaded Justice Stevens that New York’s rule was 
only procedural. He relied in part on New York’s designation of the rule 
as procedural.
186
 He also noted the costs to the federal judiciary of trying 
to discern when an ostensibly procedural state provision, in fact, 
embodies a state substantive policy.
187
 Finally, he effectively established 
a rebuttable presumption favoring the Federal Rule by stating that: “[t]he 
mere possibility that a federal rule would alter a state-created right is not 
sufficient. There must be little doubt.”188 
Justice Stevens also argued: (1) that since the New York rule 
applied to all penalty class actions—not only those based on New York 
law—the Court should not understand it to reflect New York’s 
substantive policy, and (2) before New York enacted the class action 
statute relevant to Shady Grove, plaintiff classes could maintain penalty 
class actions in the federal courts, “and New York had done nothing to 
prevent that.”189 It is difficult to follow his reasoning here; his second 
point overlooked the possibility that section 901(b) was New York doing 
something. It is almost as if he was saying that New York’s legislature 
had let too much time elapse since the passage of the CAFA before 
attempting to limit penalty class actions in the federal courts, and, hence, 
was estopped from expecting the federal courts to read section 901(b) as 
such a limit. 
Justice Stevens’s first point is similarly confusing. He seemed to 
assume that, because section 901(b) would affect class actions not based 
on New York law, the legislature must not have had a substantive policy. 
Why should that be so? That the limitation might have ancillary effects 
on non-New York claims tells nothing about the effect the legislature 
intended for claims that did sound in New York law. Perhaps the statute 
                                                          
 184. Id. at 1449, 1451 (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 185. Id. at 1459. Justice Stevens made that clear in the subheading he used—“Applying Rule 23 
Does Not Violate the Enabling Act”—after finding, and using as a sub-heading, the fact that “Rule 
23 Controls Class Certification.” Id. at 1456-57. 
 186. Id. at 1457. “The mere fact that a state law is designed as a procedural rule suggests it 
reflects a judgment about how state courts ought to operate and not a judgment about state-created 
rights and remedies.” Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
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had more than one purpose; the legislature may have designed it both to 
limit recovery of New York penalties in class actions and to prevent 
New York from becoming a magnet jurisdiction for penalty class actions 
based on other states’ laws. It is impossible to tell; the sparse legislative 
history only hints that the legislature was concerned about “annihilating 
punishment of the defendant.”190 
Finally, Justice Stevens mentioned the argument that class actions 
are unnecessary to give claimants incentive to sue in penalty cases and 
might be unduly cumbersome.
191
 This enabled him to view 
section 901(b) as a procedural calibration device,
192
 rather than as a 
substantive limitation reflecting a policy judgment on appropriate levels 
of liability in statutory penalty cases.
193
 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent interpreted section 901(b) and its history 
differently from Justice Stevens.
194
 She traced the sparse legislative 
history, quoted the New York Court of Appeals at length, and concluded 
that the legislature included section 901(b) as a substantive limitation on 
statutory penalties.
195
 “[T]he Court gives no quarter to New York’s 
                                                          
 190. Id. at 1458 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901 cmt. 11 (2006)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also supra note 166. 
 191. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1458-59. 
 192. Id. at 1459. 
 193. Consider also that section 901(b) does nothing to limit an insurer’s total exposure to 
penalties. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. section 901(b). There is no limit on the number of individual claimants 
who can sue, and there is nothing in New York law that would prevent consolidation of such actions 
under article 6 of the C.P.L.R., which would lead to just as large a single judgment in the 
consolidated action as plaintiffs could obtain in a class action. See Doernberg, The Tempest, supra 
note 92, at 1174-75 & nn.159-61. 
 194. Justice Ginsburg’s summary of the vertical choice-of-law doctrine, in Part I-A of her 
dissenting opinion, overstates the RDA’s effect in diversity actions: “[T]he Rules of Decision 
Act . . . prohibits federal courts from generating substantive law in diversity actions.” Shady Grove, 
130 S. Ct. at 1460-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). That statement is generally, but 
not universally, true. Two well known cases demonstrate that the federal courts can (and should) 
sometimes generate substantive law in diversity actions when there is a dominant federal interest. 
See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg did not cite either case. See Shady 
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460-73. 
 195. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464. Justice Ginsberg stated in dissent: 
  While the Judicial Conference proposal was in the New York Legislature’s hopper, 
“various groups advocated for the addition of a provision that would prohibit class action 
plaintiffs from being awarded a statutorily-created penalty . . . except when expressly 
authorized in the pertinent statute.” These constituents “feared that recoveries beyond 
actual damages could lead to excessively harsh results.” “They also argued that there 
was no need to permit class actions [because] statutory penalties . . . provided an 
aggrieved party with a sufficient economic incentive to pursue a claim.” Such penalties, 
constituents observed, often far exceed a plaintiff’s actual damages. “When lumped 
together,” they argued, “penalties and class actions produce overkill.” 
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 
1015 (N.Y. 2007), and Letter from Gary J. Perkinson, Exec. Dir., N.Y. Council of Retail Merchs., 
Inc., to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to Governor of N.Y. (June 4, 1975), in S. Rep. No. 1309-8, ch. 207 
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limitation on statutory damages.”196 And yet, comparing section 901(b) 
to a statutory cap on damages, as Justice Ginsburg did when she likened 
section 901(b) to the New York statute involved in Gasperini, elides a 
highly significant difference.
197
 In Gasperini, the New York statute 
expressly placed a limitation on total damages.
198
 
Contrast the Gasperini statute with the Shady Grove statute. The 
latter places no limit on an insurer’s exposure to statutory damages; it 
merely makes the total amount unrecoverable in a state class action.
199
 
Perhaps the New York legislature, yielding to pressure from insurers, 
wanted to take the class action device off the table, but it did not  
limit any insurer’s total liability for statutory damages.200 Gasperini, 
rather than buttressing the dissenters’ argument, should have been  
a caution. The New York legislature obviously knows how to limit  
 
                                                          
(N.Y. 1975)). 
  One might question the incentive argument in the context of Shady Grove. Shady Grove’s 
claim was for approximately $500. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (majority opinion). One 
month’s interest at two percent thus would be less than ten dollars, a paltry incentive to undertake 
litigation with all of its attendant expenses and stress. See id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
  That aside, the argument that the “various groups” made, referenced in Justice Ginsberg’s 
dissent, boils down to an argument against statutory penalties generally—or, at least, those that one 
might view as “disproportionate” to actual damages. See id. at 1464. Yet, the argument overlooks 
the reasons for having statutory penalties in the first place. Penalties are supposed to punish, and the 
Supreme Court has compared their purpose to that of punitive damages. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416, 418 (2003) (suggesting that punitive damages be 
compared to civil penalty amounts to help determine whether punitive damages are excessive). 
 196. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464. 
 197. Id. (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996)). 
 198. “In reviewing a money judgment in an action in which an itemized verdict is 
required . . . the appellate division shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate if it 
deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) 
(McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2010). That the limitation is not a specific dollar amount—see, for 
example, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997) (requiring noneconomic losses to medical 
malpractice victim not to exceed $250,000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302 (West 2005) 
(limiting medical malpractice recovery amounts to $1,000,000—though the court may make an 
exception “upon good cause shown”—of which no more than $250,000 can be noneconomic loss); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09(b)(1) (West 2011) (limiting noneconomic damages 
in medical malpractice cases to $650,000 through 2008 with the limit to increase thereafter by 
$15,000 per year); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301(c) (West 2012) (limiting 
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases to $250,000 per provider with an absolute 
maximum of $500,000)—is unimportant. The legislature clearly believed that there was a figure that 
a court could determine was “reasonable compensation,” and the legislature instructed New York’s 
appellate courts not to permit more than an immaterial deviation from that figure. 
 199. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1471-72. 
 200. It is also possible that the legislature concluded that the nature of penalty class actions was 
such that, to borrow the wording of Federal Rule 23, “the questions of law or fact common to class 
members [do not] predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is [not] superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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total damages when it wants to, but it refrained in the context of 
statutory penalties.
201
 
Justice Ginsburg characterized New York’s law as a limit on 
liability simpliciter.
202
 It is not; it is, instead, a limit on New York’s use 
of its class action device. As she correctly pointed out, New York law 
does not “allow class members to recover statutory damages because the 
New York legislature considered the result of adjudicating such claims 
en masse to be exorbitant.”203 She was speaking of recovery “in a single 
suit.”204 But, by the same token, it does not prevent total recovery of 
statutory damages by every claimant whose insurer unlawfully delays 
reimbursement. Allstate has no right, under New York law, to an 
exemption from paying interest to each person to whom it unlawfully 
delayed paying benefits. 
Finally, Justice Ginsburg argued that Shady Grove was inconsistent 
with Cohen.
205
 In Cohen, the Court had read then-Rule 23 to permit the 
New Jersey bond requirement to function as an “add-on” to the Federal 
Rule, since the Rule said nothing about bonds.
206
 Justice Ginsburg, in 
Shady Grove, argued that the Court should permit an analogous result by 
allowing the New York prohibition to function, even though it, like the 
Cohen bond requirement, might prevent actions that would otherwise 
have gone forward.
207
 
The argument has some force, because the cases are similar in that 
way. But it overlooks the fact that Cohen used Guaranty Trust’s 
talismanic outcome-determinative test, which Byrd rejected even for the 
Erie line of cases. Seven years after Byrd, Hanna declared the Erie 
analysis wholly inappropriate for Federal Rules cases. Thus, the Cohen 
approach, on which Justice Ginsburg relied, was twice outmoded. To 
borrow from Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion in Cohen, which 
Justice Frankfurter joined, New York’s prohibition of the class action 
device “does not add one iota to nor subtract one iota from”208 the claim  
 
                                                          
 201. For example, New York had a statutory cap on wrongful death damages in the mid-
nineteenth century. See John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American 
Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1168 & n.51 (2005). This lasted until the Constitution of 1894 
forbade such a limit. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18 (1894); Witt, supra, at 1169 & n.59. Nonetheless, 
the current version of that New York constitutional provision specifically permits the legislature to 
set limits on recovery for death in workers’ compensation cases. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
 202. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465-66. 
 203. Id. at 1466 (footnote omitted). 
 204. Id. at 1464. 
 205. See id. at 1462-63, 1468; supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. 
 206. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan. Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 544 & n.1, 555-57 (1949). 
 207. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1462-63, 1468. 
 208. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 557 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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that every insurance beneficiary (or its assignee) has against an insurer 
in Allstate’s position.209 
The justices’ differing views about section 901(b), however, divert 
attention from the far more central question of how the Court ought to 
read the Federal Rules when considering an REA challenge. That 
requires understanding the purpose of the REA’s limiting language. As 
Professor Stephen B. Burbank explains: 
The historical evidence compels the view that the limitations imposed 
by the famous first two sentences of the Act . . . were intended to 
allocate power between the Supreme Court as rule-maker and 
Congress and thus to circumscribe the delegation of legislative power, 
that they were thought to be equally relevant in all actions brought in 
federal court, and that the protection of state law was deemed a 
probable effect, rather than the primary purpose, of the allocation 
scheme established by the Act. In this aspect the history starkly 
contradicts the notion, shared by the Supreme Court and many 
commentators, that the basic purpose of the Act’s procedure/substance 
dichotomy is to allocate law-making power between the federal 
government and the states.
210
 
Therefore, to regard the REA’s limiting language as a federalism 
instrument, rather than as a separation-of-powers instrument, is to 
indulge in a serious misreading of the REA’s history and timing. As the 
Ninth Circuit has recognized, adopting Professor Burbank’s view: 
  Because the Rules Enabling Act was enacted in 1934, four years 
before the Court decided Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins . . . its 
proviso restricting the permissible scope of the rules could not have 
been designed to serve the purposes of Erie and thereby to ensure the 
primacy of state law. Rather, the proviso was designed to serve the 
                                                          
 209. The court’s decision in Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc. is analogous. 2 F.R.D. 238 (D. Minn. 
1942); see supra note 12 and accompanying text. The court in Jeub found: 
That the rights over and against Swift and Company, which B/G Foods may have by 
reason of any loss sustained by it, must be governed by the substantive laws of this State 
is entirely clear. The invoking of the third-party procedural practice must not do violence 
to the substantive rights of the parties. However, an acceleration of an expedition of the 
presentation of such rights does not conflict with any Minnesota law. 
Jeub, 2 F.R.D. at 240. Perhaps even more to the point, the court noted: 
The apparent purpose of Rule 14 is to provide suitable machinery whereby the rights of 
all parties may be determined in one proceeding . . . . Otherwise, B/G Foods, Inc., would 
be required to await the outcome of the present suit, and then if plaintiffs recover, to 
institute an independent action for contribution or indemnity. The rule under 
consideration was promulgated to avoid this very circuity of proceeding. 
Id. at 241. One can make exactly the same point about Rule 23. 
 210. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1025-26 
(1982) (footnotes omitted). 
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purposes of the anti-delegation doctrine by limiting the scope of rules 
that were adopted with minimal congressional involvement.
211
  
Neither court nor commentator has disputed that characterization. Even 
if Professor Burbank and the Ninth Circuit were mistaken about the 
office of the REA’s limiting language, that would neither explain nor 
justify the approach to the REA questions that, following Shady Grove, a 
majority of the justices appear to favor.  
V. EVALUATING FEDERAL RULES FOR REA COMPLIANCE 
For reasons that are not clear, the Court has used two quite distinct 
methods in reading the Federal Rules. To determine the scope of a 
Rule—whether it speaks to the issue sub judice—the Court looks only at 
its language, almost defiantly refusing to make inferences. Walker 
demonstrates that particularly well. Statutes of limitations prescribe how 
long a claimant has to commence his action on an accrued claim.
212
 Rule 
3 defines commencement, yet the Walker Court declined to apply it 
because it does not mention statutes of limitations.
213
 That is all the more 
remarkable because Rule 3 is the stopping point for federal limitations 
periods.
214
 Palmer, which antedates Guaranty Trust, Byrd, Hanna, and 
                                                          
 211. Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002); accord, United States v. 
Estrada, 680 F. Supp. 1312, 1325 (D. Minn. 1988). In United States v. Myers, a decision antedating 
Sain, one district court cited Professor Burbank as taking the opposite position, but the district court 
overlooked that the language upon which it relied expressed not Professor Burbank’s own view, but 
rather his summary of the mess the Court had made of interpreting the REA. 687 F. Supp. 1403, 
1414-15 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that the REA’s substance/procedure distinction “enunciated for 
the purposes of demarcating state and federal rule-making power, not determining the proper 
allocation of power within the federal government”); see also Burbank, supra note 210, at 1027-28. 
In any event, the Ninth Circuit’s contrary view supersedes that of the district court. 
 212. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (“[S]tatute[s] establishing a 
time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued.”). The problem arises 
because different legal systems have different views about what constitutes commencement for the 
purposes of a given statute of limitation. For example, in 1992, New York shifted some of its courts 
from a commencement-by-service system to a commencement-by-filing system. David D. Siegel, 
Appellate Judges Disagree – with Fatal Results for Plaintiff – About When and Whether to Extend 
to 120-Period for Summons Service When “Good Cause” Not Shown, SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV., Jan. 
2001, at 1, 2. Other courts, generally those inferior to the New York general jurisdiction trial court, 
remained on a commencement-by-service system, although New York subsequently added some 
lower courts to the commencement-by-filing system. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 304 cmt. 1 (McKinney 
2010). Sometimes, even the same legal system has divergent views. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4.16.170 (West 2005) (marking commencement at either filing the complaint or serving the 
summons, “whichever occurs first”). 
 213. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text. 
 214. See, e.g., West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987). The Court declared: 
[W]e now hold that when the underlying cause of action is based on federal law and the 
absence of an express federal statute of limitations makes it necessary to borrow a 
limitations period from another statute, the action is not barred if it has been 
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Walker, is equally persuasive.
215
 Just as Rule 3 says nothing about 
limitations periods, Rule 8(c) is silent about burdens of proof, and the 
Court refused to read it as affecting them.
216
 It is no exaggeration to say 
that the Court has taken a read-my-lips approach to questions about the 
scope of Federal Rules.
217
 In its view, Federal Rules reach only what 
their language says. 
With respect to REA problems, however, some justices’ approaches 
have been quite different. Shady Grove illustrates that. The justices 
divided sharply into two camps on how to determine whether a Rule 
violates the REA. Justice Scalia’s plurality thought the Court should not 
look at state law at all to evaluate an REA challenge. That method is 
consistent with Sibbach and with the direct-conflict approach Hanna 
prescribed. The other justices thought it essential to look at the 
conflicting state law to see whether it is substantive, viewing state and 
federal law side-by-side.
218
 The latter approach is reminiscent of  
Byrd, with its emphasis on balancing. Yet, as Hanna instructed, the  
Erie-Guaranty Trust-Byrd analysis is not appropriate if there is a Federal 
Rule directly on point. 
The unanswered question is why some of the justices use such 
radically different approaches to determine: (1) to what situations a 
Federal Rule applies, and (2) whether it exceeds the limitations of the 
REA. Of course, it is commonplace to use different analyses for 
different purposes.
219
 The point here, however, is that the purposes are 
                                                          
“commenced” in compliance with Rule 3 within the borrowed period. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sain, 309 F.3d at 1138 (finding 
that Rule 3 specifies the time at which borrowed state limitations periods start in § 1983 actions); 
supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 215. See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116-17 (1943) (discussing Rule 8(c)’s silence as to 
which party has the burden of establishing contributory negligence); supra notes 63-70 and 
accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 76-106, 129-31 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra text accompanying notes 176-84. 
 219. For example, equal protection analysis varies according to whether the individual is a 
member of a suspect class (requiring that the classification be narrowly tailored and necessary to 
achieve a compelling government interest), a quasi-suspect class (requiring the classification be 
substantially related to an important government interest), or the populace at large (requiring only 
that the classification bear a rational relationship to some permissible government goal). See JOHN 
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 687-88 (7th ed. 2004). Similarly, one 
may be competent to make a will— 
[t]estamentary capacity exists when the testator has intelligent knowledge of the natural 
objects of his bounty, the general composition of his estate, and what he wants done with 
it, even if his memory is impaired by age or disease, and the testator need not have the 
ability to conduct business affairs 
—but incompetent to stand trial on a criminal charge, “measured by the capacity to understand the 
proceedings, to consult meaningfully with counsel, and to assist in the defense.” In re Bosley, 26 
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the same. In both situations the question is whether a Rule speaks to an 
issue (without regard to whether the issue is substantive or procedural). 
On the application side, the Court is clear: if the Rule does not address 
the issue explicitly, the Rule does not apply. There is no good reason for 
not using the same approach on the REA side: if the Rule does not 
explicitly speak to a substantive issue, it does not govern that issue and 
therefore cannot violate the REA. The question should be whether the 
Rule articulates a procedural regulation or a substantive one. Read-my-
lips clarity is the Court’s approach, but only some of the time. 
The advantage of the read-my-lips approach is obvious. It is a 
clearer, better-demarcated approach than the one that five of the Shady 
Grove justices urged. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent talked about whether 
the state rule is “outcome affective,” but that is the wrong question, and 
she asked it of the wrong rule.
220
 It is a throwback to Guaranty Trust, 
which is no longer appropriate even in non-Federal Rules cases. The 
issue is not whether a state rule is outcome affective; it is whether a 
Federal Rule “abridge[s], enlarge[s] or modif[ies] any substantive 
right.”221 The REA directs attention to what the Federal Rule seeks to 
accomplish, not to the incidental effects that a Federal Rule may have on 
state law. 
Justice Ginsburg was concerned about forum shopping, as was 
Erie. Referring to the RDA, not the REA, Justice Ginsberg declared: 
“That Act directs federal courts, in diversity cases, to apply state law 
when failure to do so would invite forum-shopping and yield markedly 
disparate litigation outcomes.”222 That does not help solve the Shady 
Grove problem, because Shady Grove is not an RDA case. The issue is 
whether Rule 23 violates the REA. The Court has never read the REA to 
include, even implicitly, the same sorts of forum-shopping concerns as 
the RDA. The dissent conflated RDA analysis with REA analysis, but 
overlooked the lesson of Hanna.
223
 
Justice Ginsburg’s concern is perfectly understandable, but forum 
shopping is unavoidable in a multi-governmental system.
224
 More than 
                                                          
A.3d 1104, 1111-12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (9th ed. 2009). 
 220. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 S. Ct. 1431, 1471 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 221. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 222. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1461. 
 223. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-74 (1965); supra Part III. 
 224. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1447-48 (majority opinion). Young children intuitively 
understand this principle, for it is the rare child who, needing parental permission for some proposed 
activity, fails to consider which parent to approach, and the likelihood of getting the desired answer 
from each. 
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that, despite courts’ repeated inveighing against forum shopping,225 it is 
a duty that counsel owes to the client as part of the zealous 
representation to which the client is entitled.
226
 Many cases offer the 
opportunity for forum shopping, and counsel who fail to take advantage 
of that possibility do not serve their clients well. The removal statutes
227
 
and the transfer statutes
228
 represent congressional recognition of the 
existence and legitimacy of forum shopping. In a perfect world, forum 
shopping would never produce different results, but we have to live in 
this world. 
Forum shopping occurs with respect to vertical and horizontal 
choice-of-law problems. A single automobile accident may generate 
inconsistent outcomes depending on the forum. States have different 
choice-of-law rules that lead to different results. The Constitution has 
little to say about choice of law.
229
 It is possible that a particular choice 
in a particular case may violate the Due Process Clause
230
 or the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause,
231
 but such cases are rare because the tests the 
Court uses are so narrow. 
Litigants may prefer certain forums, perceiving substantive or 
procedural advantages. The REA Congress, however, was not concerned 
about forum shopping. It worried instead that the Supreme Court, in 
promulgating the Federal Rules, might tread on Congress’s own 
prerogatives to create federal substantive law, a concern that subsequent 
action by the Court involving New Deal legislation demonstrated had a 
sound basis.
232
 
                                                          
 225. See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467 (reiterating that unfairness results if forum shopping 
occurs); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (using injustice and confusion as reasons 
against forum shopping); Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Hanna on the importance of avoiding forum shopping); Feinstein v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 
880, 884 (1st Cir. 1981) (discussing Erie’s evils of forum shopping and inequitable administration 
of the law). 
 226. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2013); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1983). 
 227. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1447 (2006 & Supp. 2012). 
 228. See id. §§ 1404, 1406. 
 229. “[Allstate Insurance Co.] v. Hague and its progeny establish that choice-of-law doctrine is 
largely a matter of state law, and that constitutional intervention will be rare.” HAY ET AL., supra 
note 37, at 193; see Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). Hague “indicated that, 
for now at least, only minimal constitutional scrutiny will be imposed on a state’s conflicts 
decisions.” RUSSEL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 669 (6th ed. 2010) 
(footnote omitted). 
 230. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149-
50 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407 (1930). 
 231. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985); Bradford Elec. Light 
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932). 
 232. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 133 (1995). William E. Leuchtenburg states: 
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Recall the historical context in which Congress passed the REA. 
The Depression was in full swing,
233
 and Franklin D. Roosevelt was in 
the second year of his presidency.
234
 The view that the Court was 
reactionary—out of touch with the times—was widespread,235 and 
eventually led to the ill-fated court-packing proposal.
236
 Suspicion of the 
Court ran high. Congress was willing to delegate procedural rule-making 
power to the Court, but it included three safeguards of its own 
                                                          
Early in the New Deal, the Supreme Court had appeared willing to uphold novel 
legislation, but in the spring of 1935 the roof had fallen in. Justice Roberts joined the 
Four Horsemen to invalidate a rail pension law, that thereafter Roberts voted consistently 
with the conservatives. Later that same month, on “Black Monday,” May 27, 1935, the 
Court, this time in a unanimous decision, demolished the National Industrial Recovery 
Act. In the next year, the Court, by a 6-3 vote . . . , struck down the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act with an opinion by Justice Roberts that provoked a blistering dissent 
from Justice Stone, took special pains to knock out the Guffey Coal Act in the Carter [v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)] case, and in [Morehead v. New York ex. rel.] 
Tipaldo[, 298 U.S. 587 (1936)] invalidated a New York minimum wage law. “Never in a 
single year before or since,” Max Lerner later wrote, “has so much crucial legislation 
been undone, so much declared public policy nullified.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 233. See DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, FEDERALISM AND THE MAKING OF AMERICA 113 (2012). 
 234. See id. at 114. 
 235. For an extended discussion of the Court’s interaction with New Deal legislation and its 
effect on popular views of the Court, see LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 232, at 82-132. A Daily News 
editorial shortly after the 1936 election expressed this interaction as follows:  
The power of the nine men whose average age is 71 must be curtailed somehow, or the 
will of the people as expressed in their return of the New Deal to power will be thwarted. 
. . . .  
. . . The power the Supreme Court has taken to itself—to nullify any laws it does not 
like—must be taken from it if our progress is to continue. 
Op-Ed., Roosevelt Wins, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1936, at 35.  
  By the end of 1936, it had become commonplace to refer to the justices as “the nine old 
men.” LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 232, at 119. Leuchtenburg further describes this phrasing: 
A.A. Berle, a member of the Brain Trust, had used the term [the nine old men] in passing 
in 1933, and a column in a Kentucky newspaper reflected a popular notion when it 
referred to the Court as ‘nine old back-number owls (appointed by by-gone Presidents) 
who sit on the leafless, fruitless limb of an old dead tree.’ But it was the publication on 
October 26, 1936, of The Nine Old Men by the widely circulated columnists Drew 
Pearson and Robert S. Allen that made the phrase a household expression. 
Id. at 119. 
 236. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 232, at 112, 114-15 (discussing the court-packing 
proposal). The idea did not spring from President Roosevelt. PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR 
CONSTITUTION 313 (2006); see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 232, at 120. Peter Irons explains: 
Back in 1914, an earlier attorney general had proposed adding one judge to lower federal 
courts for every sitting judge who had reached the age of seventy. ‘This will insure at all 
times,’ the proposal’s author wrote, ‘the presence of a judge sufficiently active to 
discharge promptly and adequately all the duties of the court.’ That proposal came from 
James McReynolds, now seventy-two and the most dogmatic of the Four Horsemen of 
Reaction on the Supreme Court. 
IRONS, supra, at 313. 
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prerogatives: the limiting language of the REA,
237
 the preservation of 
Congress’s power effectively to veto proposed rules before they went 
into effect,
238
 and the proviso that “[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing, 
or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless 
approved by Act of Congress.”239 It could hardly be clearer that 
Congress’s concern in enacting the REA was its effect on separation of 
powers, not its effect on federalism.
240
 Finally, Congress’s acquiescence 
in Rule 23’s iterations from 1938 to the present is some evidence—not 
dispositive, certainly—that Congress did not perceive Rule 23 as 
violating the REA’s limiting language. 
The approach that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg advocated leaves 
the Court, as Rules promulgator, in an impossible position. If the content 
of state law is the measure of a Federal Rule’s legitimacy, then, in order 
to ensure compliance with the REA, the Court needs to do a fifty-state 
survey before it propounds any Rule or amendment. It cannot otherwise 
ensure that the Rule complies with the REA even when drafted. Worse, 
the Stevens-Ginsburg approach means that a Federal Rule, compliant 
with the REA when promulgated, may become non-compliant when 
states change their laws.
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 Finally, a Federal Rule may simultaneously 
be REA-compliant in one state, but not so in an identical case in 
another—so much for uniform federal procedure. Surely the 1934 
Congress could not have had that in mind when it enacted the REA. 
Even if one thinks that Congress intended the limiting language of 
the REA to serve federalism rather than separation of powers,
242
 it 
should make no difference. Since Hanna nearly half a century ago, the 
Court has consistently said that the Federal Rules mean only what they 
say explicitly. That compels the conclusion that, if a Federal Rule does 
not explicitly address a substantive right, it does not run afoul  
of the REA. 
 
                                                          
 237. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). 
 238. See id. § 2074(a). 
 239. Id. § 2074(b). 
 240. See Burbank, supra note 210, at 1036. Professor Burbank adds: 
In the end, as in the beginning, of the movement, the high ground in the debate about the 
uniform federal procedure bill involved the allocation of lawmaking power between the 
Supreme Court as rule-maker and Congress. State interests as such were acknowledged 
only late in the course of the bill’s pre-1934 history. Their protection was deemed a 
consequence, not the goal, of the bill’s procedure/substance dichotomy. 
Id. 
 241. To be sure, changes in the U.S. Constitution may have the effect of invalidating 
previously enacted legislation, but the apparent analogy is false. Under the Supremacy Clause, the 
Constitution is superior to ordinary legislation. State law, however, is not superior to federal law. 
 242. See supra notes 206-22 and accompanying text. 
2014] HOW THE FEDERAL COURTS UNDERSTAND THE FRCP 837 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Court should heed its own approach in cases like Palmer, 
Walker, and Burlington Northern, and especially the wisdom of Dr. 
Seuss: the Federal Rules say what they mean, and they mean what they 
say
243—and not anything else. If a Federal Rule does not specifically 
address a substantive right, then it does not violate the REA.
244
 The 
Stevens-Ginsburg approach threatens to undercut Congress’s desire that 
the federal courts have uniform rules of procedure, untethered to state 
law.
245
 It creates for the Federal Rules the same problem that Guaranty 
Trust’s outcome-determinative test did.246 To ask whether a state rule is 
“outcome-affective,” as Justice Ginsburg did, is to launch an inquiry 
both broad and formless. Even the sentence in which Justice Ginsburg 
adverted to “outcome-affective” raises problems: 
In short, Shady Grove’s effort to characterize [section] 901(b) as 
simply ‘procedural’ cannot successfully elide this fundamental norm: 
When no federal law or rule is dispositive of an issue, and a state 
statute is outcome affective in the sense our cases on Erie (pre and 
post-Hanna) develop, the Rules of Decision Act commands application 
of the State’s law in diversity suits.
247
 
At the outset, the sentence assumes the conclusion that no Federal Rule 
applied, but that was the first question in Shady Grove. Even the 
dissenters seemed to accept that Rule 23 applied by its own terms, 
though they urged that the Court should interpret it to avoid the 
conflict.
248
 The real issue was whether New York’s contrary rule could 
displace Rule 23. The Shady Grove dissent represents, in essence, a 
retreat to the method of Guaranty Trust, an implicit rejection of Hanna, 
and a concomitant return to the Erie analysis under the RDA, but the 
RDA does not control the Federal Rules.
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Any procedural rule can affect substantive rights; the Court’s 
experience with, and Hanna’s rejection of, Guaranty Trust’s method as 
applied to the Federal Rules bear explicit witness to that. But the 
ancillary effect on substantive rights that a Federal Rule may have is not 
the issue at which the 1934 Congress aimed. The Federal Rules may not 
prescribe abridgments, enlargements or modifications of substantive 
rights, state or federal. As long as they refrain from doing so, they satisfy 
the REA’s command. 
 
